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Abstract
Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided
for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two
simultaneous ascending price auctions have proved to be extremely successful. These are the si-
multaneous multiround ascending auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA).
It has long been known that, for certain classes of valuation functions, the SMRA provides good
theoretical guarantees on social welfare. However, no such guarantees were known for the CCA.
In this paper, we show that CCA does provide strong guarantees on social welfare provided
the price increment and stopping rule are well-chosen. This is very surprising in that the choice
of price increment has been used primarily to adjust auction duration and the stopping rule
has attracted little attention. The main result is a polylogarithmic approximation guarantee for
social welfare when the maximum number of items demanded C by a bidder is fixed. Specifically,
we show that either the revenue of the CCA is at least an Ω
(
1
C2 log n log2 m
)
-fraction of the optimal
welfare or the welfare of the CCA is at least an Ω
(
1
logn
)
-fraction of the optimal welfare, where
n is the number of bidders and m is the number of items. As a corollary, the welfare ratio – the
worst case ratio between the social welfare of the optimum allocation and the social welfare of the
CCA allocation – is at most O(C2 · logn · log2m). We emphasize that this latter result requires
no assumption on bidders valuation functions. Finally, we prove that such a dependence on C is
necessary. In particular, we show that the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least Ω
(
C · logm
log logm
)
.
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1 Introduction
The question of how best to allocate spectrum dates back over a century. In the academic literature,
the case in favor of the sale of bandwidth was first formalized by Coase [14] in 1959. Since the 1990s
spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. Moreover, for these bandwidth auctions, it
has become apparent that “not all markets are alike". Outcomes, in terms of economic efficiency,
revenue and the resultant level of competition in the telecommunications industry, are heavily
dependent upon the choice of auction mechanism – see [31], [30] and [16] for detailed discussions.
In practice, two simultaneous ascending price type auctions have proved extremely success-
ful: the simultaneous multiround ascending auction (SMRA) and the combinatorial clock auction
(CCA). The SMRA was designed by Milgrom, Wilson and McAfee for the 1994 FCC spectrum auc-
tion; see [34]. Compared with sealed-bid auctions, such as the VCG, ascending auctions are widely
believed to be more suitable for this scenario. For example, ascending auctions induce information
transfers that allow prices to more accurately reflect valuations.1 A consequence is more econom-
ically efficient allocations and, potentially, higher revenues. The SMRA has been very successful
in practice but it also has drawbacks [16]. Amongst them is the exposure problem: a large set
may be desired but such a bid may result in being allocated only a smaller undesirable subset. In
auctions with complementarities, such as the spectrum auctions, this can become a serious issue.
The CCA, due to Porter et al. [36], was designed to overcome this problem, and its usage has gained
substantial momentum recently. Within the last two years, over ten major spectrum auctions have
used extensions of the CCA [5, 16, 2] and generated approximately 20 billion dollars in revenue [2].2
Whilst, under certain conditions, there are theoretical explanations for the high social welfare
(economic efficiency) produced by the SMRA [33, 29, 24, 23], the performance guarantee of the
CCA remains elusive. One possible reason for this lack of success is that, upon first examination,
no good welfare guarantees seem achievable for the CCA, even for very simple valuation functions.
In Section 6.1, we show that the welfare ratio – the worst case ratio between the social welfare of
the optimum allocation and the social welfare of the CCA allocation – can be as high as O(
√
n)
even for unit-demand bidders. Here n denotes the total number of bidders (we will denote by m
the number of items). Moreover, we also show the welfare ratio can be has high as O(n)-ratio, even
when demand bundles have cardinality at most two. However, a better selection of price increments,
allows us to obtain polylogarithmic upper bounds on the welfare ratio for the CCA if the bidders
demand is small (e.g. she is only interested in bundles of cardinality at most polylogarithmic in the
number of items and bidders). In the Porter et al. CCA mechanism, price increments were fixed to
be 1 whenever there is excess demand. We obtain our strong welfare guarantees simply by requiring
the price increments to be a function of excess demand. Specifically, if there are k bids containing
item j then we increase pj by ǫ · k, where ǫ is a small constant chosen by the auctioneer. With this
modification, we obtain:
Informal Theorem 1. If all bids have cardinality at most C, then either the revenue of the CCA
is at least an Ω( 1C2 logn log2 m)-fraction of the optimal social welfare, or the welfare of the CCA is at
least an Ω( 1logn)-fraction of the optimal welfare.
This result has two appealing properties. First, it does not make any assumption on the valu-
ations. Hence, it accommodates complementarities, which are common in combinatorial auctions
but are typically hard to deal with. Second, it guarantees that either the revenue of the CCA is
1Indeed, the price discovery process allows bidders to learn valuations (including their own valuations!). This is
particularly important in bandwidth auctions [16].
2These auctions were held worldwide, for example, in Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, UK,
Switzerland, etc.
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high or the welfare is close to the optimal. Since the social welfare is always not smaller than the
revenue, our theorem directly implies the following upper bound on the welfare ratio.
Informal Theorem 2. If all bids have cardinality at most C then the welfare ratio for the CCA is
at most O(C2 log n log2m).
Therefore when bidders only demand sets of cardinality at most k, where k = O(poly(log n, logm)),
the CCA has polylogarithmic welfare ratio.
So the choice of price-increments is fundamental in guaranteeing good performance. Our results
show that the choice of stopping rule is also critical. Indeed, they rely upon usage of the original
stopping rule of Porter et al. [36]. However, in recent versions of the CCA this stopping rule has been
replaced by the simpler stopping rule used by the SMRA – unfortunately, we show in Section 6.2
that the SMRA stopping rule is insufficient to guarantee good welfare. Finally, one might wonder
if the dependence on C is necessary. We show in Section 5 that this dependence is unavoidable for
general valuations.
Informal Theorem 3. For any integer C, there exist arbitrarily large integers n and m and an
auction with n bidders and m items such that each bidder only bid on sets with cardinality at most
C where the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least Ω(C · logmlog logm ).
We now provide a brief road-map of our paper. In Section 2, we give an overview of the CCA and
SMRA auctions and discuss related work. We give a formal description of the CCA in Section 3.
In Section 6, we provide examples showing that wrong choices of price increment and stopping
condition can be detrimental for the performance of the CCA. In Section 4.1, we introduce some
of the key ideas and techniques required in a simple setting. Namely, we use them to prove a
polylogarithmic welfare guarantee for the special case of unit-demand bidders. We generalize this
approach to obtain our main results in Section 4.2. Finally, we prove a lower bound of welfare
approximation for the CCA in Section 5.
2 An Overview of the SMRA and CCA
Both the SMRA and the CCA are based upon the same underlying ascending price mechanism: at
time t, each item j has a price ptj. At these prices, each bidder i selects her preferred set S
t
i of items.
The price of any item that has excess demand then rises in the next time period and the process
then is repeated. The first major difference between these auction mechanisms lies in the bidding
language. The SMRA uses item bidding. The auctioneer views the selection Sti as a collection of
bids, one bid for every subset of Sti . However this leads to the exposure problem. To overcome
this problem, the CCA uses package (combinatorial) bidding. A package bid is an all-or-nothing
proposition: the selection of Sti is a bid for exactly S
t
i and nothing else.
The original CCA, due to Porter et al. [36], terminates whenever the last round bids are disjoint
and not in conflict with the revenue-optimal allocation; see Section 3 for details. The SMRA (and
later versions of the CCA) terminates when there is no excess demand for any item. The auctions
differ significantly in how items are allocated. The SMRA utilizes the concept of standing high bid.
Any item (with a positive price) has a provisional winner. That bidder will win the item unless
a higher bid is received in a later round. If such a bid is received then the standing high bid is
increased and a new provisional winner assigned (chosen at random in the case of a tie). It is not
difficult to see that this allocation rule increases the risk of exposure for the bidders. In the CCA,
the maximum revenue allocation is output. All bids, regardless of the time they were made, are
eligible for this allocation, with the constraint that each bidder has at most one accepted bid.
3
2.1 Social Welfare
In practice these ascending auctions have performed extremely well. A major reason for this is that
the associated dynamic processes encourage accurate price discovery [5, 16]. For the SMRA, there
are theoretical results that explain this practical performance. These results are driven by the use
of (aesthetically unappealing but important) standing high bids which ensure that every item with
a positive price is sold, since each such item has a provisional winner. This concept of standing high
bids was introduced by Crawford and Knoer [17] to study a simple market matching workers to
firms. Their model encompasses an ascending auction with unit-demand bidders which converges,
under truthful bidding, to a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes social welfare. Moreover, Kelso
and Crawford [29] showed that welfare-maximizing Walrasian equilibrium are also obtained, under
truthful bidding, in auctions where the bidder valuations satisfy the gross substitutes property; see
also [24]. The method to select items for price rises in the Kelso-Crawford mechanism differs from
the more natural choice made by the SMRA, which increments the prices of all items under excess
demand. Milgrom [33], however, showed these results continue to hold for the SMRA. Walrasian
equilibrium need not exist for more general valuations, but approximate welfare guarantees can still
be obtained for submodular valuation functions [23]. No such theoretical results are know for the
CCA and that is the motivation behind this work.
2.2 Bidding Activity Rules
It is important to note that, in practice, accompanying the ascending price mechanisms are a set
of bidding activity rules. The activity rules are designed to induce truthful bidding in each round.
This is extremely important – Cramton [16] states that the “truthful expression of preferences is
what leads to excellent price discovery and ultimately an efficient auction outcome”. For the SMRA,
though, the activity rules are quite weak and strategic bidding is common and, often, profitable [16].
In contrast, the CCA incorporates a much stronger set of bidding activity rules for each round than
the SMRA. In particular, the CCA applies a set of revealed preference (RP) constraints on feasible
bids. Suppose at time s we bid for package S and at time t > s we bid for package T . In its weak
form, see Ausubel et al. [5], revealed preference produces a constraint pt(S)−ps(S) ≥ pt(T )−ps(T ).
That is, such bidding behavior can only be rational if the price of package S has risen by at least
the rise in the price of package T . If not the bid for package T is forbidden. Moreover, in its
general form [26, 1], the revealed preference rules ensure that the only bidding strategies that are
admissible correspond to virtual valuation functions. Indeed, even relaxed implementations of the
constraints allow only for approximate virtual valuation functions; see Boodaghians and Vetta [11].
If follows that strategic behavior must take a very restricted form in the CCA, essentially consisting
of pre-commiting to a virtual valuation function. Given the lack of information and the dynamic
nature of the CCA, such a pre-commitment is hard to compute and extremely risky. Consequently,
the working assumption in this paper that bidders behave truthfully in a competitive CCA auction
is reasonable.
2.3 Practical Implications
We show that modifying the price-increments can have fundamental impact on social welfare. This is
quite remarkable because, in practice, the choice of price increments has been primarily considered as
a matter of fine-tuning. Price increments are seen as a way to affect the length of the auction whilst
having minimal effect on the final outcome. Indeed, Ausubel and Baranov [2] state that “Among
all design decisions that need to be made prior to the auction, [the choice of price increments] is
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considered relatively unimportant and is often overlooked by the design team”. Our results show that
the choice of price increments is actually extremely important.
Our results also show that another apparently innocuous aspect of the CCA mechanism is vital
in generating high welfare: the choice of stopping rule. Recall, the original CCA only terminates
when there is no excess demand induced by the bids in the current round and the maximum revenue
allocation over all rounds is not in conflict with the current round bids. Current implementations
of the CCA are based upon the two-stage mechanism of Ausubel, Cramton and Milgrom [5]. There,
the ascending price mechanism, as described, is used in the first-phase except that the stopping rule
reverts to the simple rule used in the SMRA: the mechanism terminates if bids in the current round
are disjoint. The use of this simple stopping rule is unfortunate: its use cannot guarantee high
welfare. We present, in Section 6.2, a simple example with demand sets of cardinality two where,
under this stopping rule, the CCA produces arbitrarily poor welfare, even when price-increments
are a function of excess demand.
Finally, it remains to discuss computational aspects. The combinatorial allocation problem is
notoriously hard to approximate (it contains maximum independent set as a special case). This
appears to suggest that the CCA is not implementable in polynomial time. In spectrum auctions,
however, bid patterns are highly structured. This has two major effects. First, given a set of prices,
bidders do seem able to make bids in a timely manner. Second, the resultant combinatorial allocation
problems can be solved almost instantaneously using standard branch and bound optimization
techniques. As a consequence, it does not appear that computational constraints are currently a
major concern in implementing ascending auctions in practice.
2.4 Related Work
An alternative approach for unit-demand auctions was examined by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
[20]. Their ascending auction also outputs a Walrasian equilibrium that maximizes social welfare but
without the need for standing high bidders. To achieve this, however, each bidder is now required
to submit their entire demand set3 in each round, rather than just a single bid as in the SMRA and
CCA. Given prices, the mechanism tests whether a Walrasian equilibrium can be produced from
the demand sets; if not, a set of items under excess demand is obtained based upon Hall’s theorem.
Gul and Stacchetti [25] showed this approach also generalizes to auctions where bidder valuations
satisfy the gross substitutes property. Interestingly, these ascending auctions produce the minimum
set of Walrasian prices, which in the case of unit-demands also correspond to VCG payments.
However, Gul and Stacchetti [25] proved that it is not possible to implement the VCG mechanism
via an ascending auction for general valuations, even those with the gross substitutes property.
Thus, truthful bidding does not form an equilibrium in the corresponding direct mechanism. To go
beyond the gross substitutes property, De Vries, Schummer and Vohra [38] dropped the requirement
of anonymous prices. Instead, each bundle requires a separate price for each bidder.
From the theory of computation side, a relevant and fruitful direction is to approximate the
welfare of a combinatorial auction with simple but not necessarily truthful auctions [13, 7, 27, 22,
37, 6], for example, simultaneous single-item auctions, the ascending auction of Gul and Stacchetti,
etc. The focus of this sequence of papers is to show the price of anarchy in these games is some small
constant for a certain set of valuations. In particular, Babaioff et al. [6] showed that as long as the
simple auction maximizes the welfare over the bidders’ declared valuations, the price of anarchy is
a small constant. Unfortunately, this result cannot be applied to the CCA, which is not a declared
welfare maximizer. Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, none the known results directly applies
3The demand set consists of every bundle that maximizes profits given the prices in that round.
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to the CCA. We suspect that the slow progress is largely due to the ignorance of the complicated
dynamic behavior of the mechanism. We hope the results and techniques developed may help tackle
other research questions related to the CCA, such as its price of anarchy.
3 The Combinatorial Clock Auction
We now give a detailed description of the CCA. To begin with, we present some notations and
definitions. Let N be the set of the bidders and M be the set of items. Each bidder i has value
vi(S) for any set of items S ⊆ M . The price p(S) for a set of item S is simply the sum of prices
for each item in S. The utility of bidder i for set S is vi(S) − p(S), where p(S) is the price of S.
The CCA outputs an allocation S = {S1, . . . , Sn}, where the Si are pairwise-disjoint subsets of the
items, and a collection of prices {pj}j∈[m]. The social welfare of an allocation S is
∑
i vi(Si) and
the revenue is
∑
i p(Si) =
∑
i
∑
j∈Si pj. Let OPT = maxS
∑
i vi(Si) be the optimal social welfare
and R∗ be the corresponding allocation. The CCA is then formalized in Procedure 1.
Procedure 1 The Combinatorial Clock Auction
Let t = 0 and the initial price p0j be 0 for every item j.
loop
Each bidder i bids for the set of items Sti of largest positive utility (breaking ties arbitrarily).
A bidder drops out if she has non-positive utility for every subset of M .
Let P ti =
∑
j∈Sti p
t
j be the price for set S
t
i in round t.
for j = 1 to n do
pt+1j ← ptj + ǫ ·
∑
Sti :j∈Sti 1.
end for
if the sets Sti are pairwise disjoint then
Amongst all the bids {(St′i , P t
′
i )}i∈[n],t′≤t ever made, find the revenue maximizing allocation
S∗ = (St
∗
1
1 , . . . , S
t∗n
n ), that is, S
∗ ∈ argmax
disjoint sets: S
t1
1 ,...,S
tn
n
∑
i
∑
j∈Stii
ptij .
if Sti ∩ S
t∗j
j = ∅ for every i 6= j then
Output Allocate the set of items S
t∗i
i to bidder i, and charge her P
t∗i
i as the payment.
end if
end if
t← t+ 1.
end loop
Note that the CCA does terminate. If not, prices will monotonically increase and eventually
force every bidder to drop out, then the stopping condition is trivially satisfied. The length of the
auction depends on ǫ. In most ascending auctions, the price increment ǫ is a small constant chosen
by the auctioneer and the values of bidders are assumed to be integers. Since the CCA is scale
invariant4, for notational simplicity, we set ǫ = 1 and assume every bidder i’s value for any set of
items S is a multiple of some integer W ≥ n3m2.
Before proceeding further, we present a few simple but useful facts about the CCA. The utility
of bidder i in round t, denoted by uti, is her utility for her favorite set of items, given the prices in
round t. Formally, uti = maxS⊆M
(
vi(S)−
∑
j∈S p
t
j
)
. Since S can be ∅, uti is always non-negative.
With this definition, we are ready to show some properties of the CCA. As Fact 2 is self-evident,
4If we multiply all the values, bids and prices by a common factor, the execution of the mechanism is the same.
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we do not provide the proof here.
Fact 1. For any bidder, uti is monotonically non-increasing.
Proof. Suppose uti < u
t′
i for some t
′ > t. Let S be a set of items satisfying ut
′
i = vi(S) −
∑
j∈S p
t′
j .
Since prices are non-decreasing, we have vi(S) −
∑
j∈S p
t
j ≥ vi(S) −
∑
j∈S p
t′
j > u
t
i, contradicting
the maximality of uti.
Fact 2. If bidder i bids on S in round t > 0, then vi(S)>u
t
i.
Fact 3. If bidder i is still active when the stopping condition is met, then i is allocated a subset of
items whose value is at least her utility in the final round.
Proof. Let tˆ be the final round. Since no item in S tˆi is allocated to any bidder j 6= i in the CCA (by
definition of the stopping condition), the entire set S tˆi may still be allocated by the mechanism to
bidder i. Thus, i must win some items in the revenue-optimal allocation. Let us assume she wins
S
t∗i
i 6= ∅ for some t∗i ≤ tˆ. By Fact 1, u
t∗i
i ≥ utˆi. Therefore, her value for S
t∗i
i is clearly at least u
tˆ
i.
4 Social Welfare Guarantees for the CCA
We are now ready to quantitatively analyse the CCA. We begin with the case of unit-demand
bidders, and prove that the CCA achieves a polylogarithmic fraction of the optimal social welfare.
Whilst the case of unit-demand bidders might seem limited, the techniques developed for this basic
case will be important as we then use them to extend our results to general valuation functions.
4.1 The Welfare Ratio for Unit-demand Bidders
We say a bidder is unit-demand, if she demands one item at most. Formally, we define bidder
i’s valuation as vi(S) = maxj∈S vij where vij is i’s value for item j. For unit-demand bidders, a
feasible allocation is simply a matching between the bidders and the items. In this section, we
show the matching selected by the CCA achieves an Ω
(
1
logn log2 m
)
-fraction of the optimal social
welfare. But we have already seen two mechanism that maximize social welfare in this special
case. So before proving the logarithmic welfare ratio for the CCA, it is informative to understand
why the CCA does not achieve optimality. First the Crawford-Knoer mechanism [17] achieves
optimality via the use of standing high bids. But the motivation behind the CCA was to allow
package bidding on multi-item auctions with complementarities and then standing high bids. The
Demange et al. mechanism [20] achieves optimality by requiring that each bidder submits her entire
demand set. From a theoretical viewpoint that is exactly the right thing to do, and the CCA losses
out by requiring one bid per round only. In practice, however, the Gul and Stacchetti mechanism
[25] (which generalizes the Demange et al. mechanism for general demand) would be extremely
complicated for bidders to use. Moreover, it is not clear how one could use simple bidding activity
rules to incentivize truthful bidding in such a complex auction. In contrast, the CCA is a very simple
mechanism that is incentivizable using bidding activity rules. This is important as experiments [10]
suggest that simplicity is key if we want to generate welfare and revenue.
Now let’s return to analysing the CCA. Whilst it is difficult to directly relate the welfare of the
CCA with the optimal social welfare, we establish our result using a greedy allocation as a proxy of
the CCA’s outcome. We show that there are only two possibilities for the greedy allocation: (i) the
revenue of this allocation is at least Ω
(
OPT
logn log2m
)
, and since the CCA selects the revenue optimal
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allocation, its revenue can only be higher; or (ii) the greedy allocation has small revenue, but many
bidders still have high utility when the ascending-price phase ends. Combining this property with
Fact 3, we can immediately show that the welfare of the allocation selected by the CCA is at least
Ω
(
OPT
logn
)
.
The greedy allocation method is shown in Procedure 2. Since bidders are unit-demand, we will
use vij to denote bidder i’s value for item j, and s
t
i to denote the item bidder i bids on at round t.
Our greedy algorithm simply allocates the item to the highest available bid, then removes all bids
that conflict with it and repeats. We terminate this procedure when the highest bid is smaller than
some predetermined threshold b only to make the analysis cleaner.
Procedure 2 Greedy Allocation Procedure for Unit-demand Bidders
Input: S = {(sti, ptsti)}i,t the collection of bids made in the CCA and b ≥ n
2 the threshold.
while S 6= ∅ do
Let (sti, p
t
sti
) be the bid with maximum price (break ties arbitrarily).
if pt
sti
≥ b then
Allocate item sti to bidder i with price p
t
sti
.
Remove every bid of bidder i and remove every bid (or any bidder) for item sti in S.
else
return
end if
end while
Theorem 4. Either the revenue of the CCA for unit-demand bidders is at least OPT
480 logn log2m
or the
social welfare is at least OPT24 logn .
5 Thus, the welfare ratio is at most O(log n log2m).
We will use the following notation. Let X be the set of bidders that have been assigned items
in the greedy algorithm and X˜ be the set of items that are allocated to them. Let k ≥ |X| be some
integer and c ∈ [3, n2 − 1] be an integer that we will specify later. A key lemma is that if k is small
then the utility of bidders that are not in X decreases in a slow rate. Specifically,
Lemma 5 (Time Amplifying for Unit-demand Bidders). Let S be a set of at least c·k bidders disjoint
from X (|X| ≤ k), such that every bidder i ∈ S has utility at least u ≥ 2b in round t ≥ b + c − 1.
If the greedy algorithm has revenue less than k · b−mn, then in any round up to (c− 2)(t+ 1)− 1
(the mechanism can terminate before that), there is a subset of at least |S| − c · k bidders of S such
that each of them has utility at least u− 2b.
As Lemma 5 is mainly used when |S| >> c ·k and u >> b, let us consider |S| and u being much
larger than k and b. Intuitively, it states that if at round t there exists a large set S, in which all
bidders have high utility, then throughout round c · t, most bidders in S (at least |S| − c · k bidders)
still have high utility (u− 2b).
Before providing the formal proof of Lemma 5, let us first sketch the underlying idea. Notice
that every bidder in S has utility at least u till round t. Thus, by Facts 1 and 2, every bidder i in
S has value at least u for each item in Qi, where Qi is the collection of every item that i ever bid
on in the first t rounds. For any set S′ ⊆ S, if all bidders in S′ have utility no more than u − 2b
5We remark that we have not attempted to optimize the constants in this theorem.
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at a certain round, then every item in ∪i∈S′Qi must have price at least 2b. However, for any item
in ∪i∈S′Qi − X˜, only bidders selected by the greedy algorithm (the ones in X) can bid on it after
the price has reached b. If not, then there exists a bidder outside X that should have been chosen
by the greedy algorithm because she made a bid on some item not in X˜ at price higher than b. If
|S′| ≥ c ·k, then it is easy to argue that |∪i∈S′Qi− X˜| ≈ c·t·kb . As each item in ∪i∈S′Qi− X˜ requires
about b bids from bidders in X, these bidders need to make roughly c · t · k many bids. There are
at most k bidders in X so, in total, this will take at least c · t rounds. We are now ready to present
the formal argument.
Proof of Lemma 5: Let t′ be the first round where at least c · k bidders from S have utility at
most u − 2b, and let S′ be the set of these bidders. If t′ does not exist, then at least |S| − c · k
bidders from S have utility at least u− 2b when the mechanism terminates. Lemma 5 holds.
Because every bidder i ∈ S has utility u at round t, Facts 1 and 2 ensure that vij ≥ u for any
item j that i bids on in the first t rounds. Let M ′ be the items in M − X˜ that are bid on by some
bidder in S′ during the first t rounds. Bidders in S′ make |S′| · t bids in total. How many bids can
they make on X˜? No bidder from S′ is allocated an item by the greedy algorithm. Therefore, for
any item j in X˜, none of the bids made by bidders in S′ can exceed the price pj that the greedy
algorithm sells the item for. So, before the final round, the total number of bids from S′ on item j
is less than pj. In the last round, they make at most |S′| ≤ n bids. Therefore, the total number of
bids made on X˜ is at most the revenue of the greedy allocation plus n ·m, which is at most k · b by
assumption.
As none of the bidders from S′ is selected by the greedy algorithm, bidders from S′ must stop
bidding on any item in M − X˜ after its price reach b. Thus, the total number of bids made by
bidders from S′ on any item in M − X˜ is at most b + n, implying |M ′| ≥ |S′|·t−k·bb+n . Note that for
each item in M ′, at least one bidder in S′ has value at least u for it. Thus, at round t′, the price for
each of these items must be at least 2b, otherwise that bidder will have utility greater than u− 2b.
In the round when the price of j passes b, its price is at most b + n. Bidders from X need to
make at least another b − n bids to drive the price up to 2b. Because |M ′| ≥ |S′|·t−k·bb+n , they must
make at least (b− n) · (|S′|·t−k·b)b+n bids. As there are at most k bidders in X, we have
t′ ≥ b− n
b+ n
· |S
′| · t− k · b
k
≥ (1− 2
n
) · |S
′| · t− k · b
k
(b ≥ n2)
≥ (1− 2
n
) · (c · t− b) (|S′| ≥ c · k)
≥ (1− 2
n
) · (c− 1)(t+ 1) (t ≥ b+ c− 1)
≥ (c− 2)(t + 1) (n
2
− 1 ≥ c)
By definition of t′, it is then straightforward to see that at round t′− 1 ≥ (c− 2)(t+1)− 1 there
are at least |S| − c · k bidders from S such that each of them has utility at least u− 2b. 
In order to prove Theorem 4, we need one more Lemma. The proof of this Lemma is fairly
standard. However we prove it for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 6. Let R∗ = (R1, . . . , Rn) be the allocation that maximizes the social welfare. Then there
exists a set B and a real number v∗ such that every bidder i ∈ B has value between [v∗, 2v∗] for the
set Ri and the total value for bidders in B is at least
OPT
3 logn .
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Proof. Let there be ℓ non-empty sets in R∗, and we define the value for a set Ri to be vi(Ri). By
definition,
∑ℓ
i=1 vi(Ri) = OPT. Now we construct 2⌈log n⌉ + 1 bins, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2⌈log n⌉ the
i-th bin Bi contains all sets with values in (
OPT
2i
, OPT
2i−1
] . The last bin contains all the other sets.
Since every set in the last bin has value at most OPTn2 and contains at most n sets, the total value
of the last bin is at most OPTn . Therefore,
∑2⌈log n⌉
i=1 v(Bi) ≥ (1− 1/n)OPT, where v(Bi) is the sum
of the values from sets in Bi. That means there exists a bin Bi∗ such that
v(Bi∗) ≥ (1− 1/n)OPT
2⌈log n⌉ ≥
OPT
3 log n
.
We simply let B = Bi∗ .
With Lemma 5 and 6, we are ready to prove Theorem 4. Again, we first sketch the proof idea.
Let B and v∗ be the same as in Lemma 6. We set the threshold b to be Θ( v
∗
logm ). The goal is to
argue that if the revenue of the greedy allocation is less than Θ( OPT
logn log2m
), then most bidders from
B still have utility as high as Θ(v∗) when the CCA terminates. This implies the social welfare is
at least Θ(OPTlogn ) by Fact 3. First note that if more than
B
logm bidders are selected by the greedy
algorithm (i.e. bidders in X) then the revenue already meets our target. So we assume this is not
the case. This means the number of bidders in B−X is at least logm times more than the number
of bidders in X. Since all these bidders have utility at least v∗ ≈ logm · b in the beginning, we can
apply Lemma 5 to this set of bidders. The key insight in this proof is that we can repetitively apply
Lemma 5 on the set of bidders that still have high utility. Because each application of Lemma 5
decreases the size of the set of bidders and their utilities linearly in |X| and b, we can apply it
Θ(logm) times provided the CCA has not yet terminated. If this is the case, the CCA runs for
at least Θ(m · b) rounds. Since any active bidder makes a bid each round, it is easy to show that
throughout Θ(m · b) many rounds this bidder has to make a bid on some item outside X˜ (the set of
items allocated in the greedy algorithm) at a price larger than b. This gives a contradiction. Hence,
the CCA must terminate before that amount of rounds. In this case, we can argue that at least a
constant fraction of bidders in B −X still have utility Θ(v∗) when the CCA terminates, implying
high social welfare. We now formalise this argument.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let B and v∗ be as in Lemma 6. We use K to denote the size of B. Let
the threshold b = v
∗
c1 logm
and k = Kc2 logm for some constants c1 and c2 that will be specified later.
We will prove that either the revenue of the greedy algorithm, with our choice of b, is at least
g = OPT
6c1c2 logn log
2m
or the social welfare of the CCA is at least OPT24 logn .
First, by Lemma 6 and our choice of the parameters, it is easy to verify that k · b ≥ g. So we
can assume |X| ≤ k from now on. Otherwise the revenue is already at least |X| · b > g. Let X ′ be
the set of bidders that items in X˜ are allocated to under R∗ and let Y = B − X − X ′. Because
|X ′| ≤ |X˜| = |X| ≤ k, we have |Y | ≥ (c2 logm− 2)k. Let Z be the set of items that are allocated
to bidders in Y in the allocation R∗, and let t1 be the first round (if it exists) where at least c · k
items in Z have prices at least 2b. We proceed by case analysis.
Case (1): t1 does not exist. By the definition of t1, this means that when the CCA terminates at
round t, there exists a set Y ′ ⊆ Y of bidders whose allocated items in R∗ have prices no more than
2b at round t and |Y ′| ≥ |Y | − ck ≥ |Y |/2. Therefore, uti ≥ v∗ − 2b ≥ v∗/2 for any bidder i ∈ Y ′.
By Fact 3, the social welfare of the greedy allocation is then at least
|Y ′| · uti ≥
|Y | · v∗
4
≥ c2 · k · logm · v
∗
8
≥ Kv
∗
8
≥ OPT
24 log n
.
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Case (2): t1 exists. Since Z is disjoint from X˜ , only bidders fromX can bid on items in Z after their
prices reach b. Thus, t1 ≥ (b−n)·c·k|X| , because k ≥ |X| and b ≥ n2 and c ≥ 3, t1 ≥ c · (b− n) > b+ c.
By the definition of t1, we know at round t1− 1 there are at least |Y |− c ·k bidders whose allocated
items in R∗ have prices less than 2b. Let us call this set of bidders Y1, and clearly they all have
utility at least u1 = v
∗ − 2b at round t1 − 1. Let t2 be the first round (if it exists) that at least c · k
bidders from Y1 have utility no greater than u2 = u1 − 2b, and let Y2 be the set of bidders from Y1
that still have utility at least u2 at round t2 − 1. Now we let Y1 be S, u1 be u and t1 − 1 be t and
apply Lemma 5 on them, the lemma gives that t2 − 1 ≥ (c− 2)t1 − 1. Hence, t2 ≥ (c− 2) · t1.
There is nothing special about Y1, u1 and t1 − 1. If we recursively define ti as the first round
that at least c · k bidders from Yi−1 have utility no greater than ui = ui−1 − 2b, and Yi as the
set of bidders from Yi−1 that still have utility at least ui at round ti − 1, we can apply Lemma 5
on Yi−1, ui−1 and ti−1 − 1 as long as they satisfy the conditions in Lemma 5 (and that ti exists).
In that case, we have ti ≥ (c − 2) · ti−1. How many times can we apply Lemma 5 before the
conditions are violated? Since the size of Yi decreases by at most c · k and ui decreases by 2b in
every application of Lemma 5, we have |Yi| ≥ |Y | − i · c · k and ui = v∗ − 2i · b. To violate the
conditions of Lemma 5, we need |Yi| < c · k or ui < 2b, hence we can apply Lemma 5 for at least
ℓ′ = min{[ |Y |c·k ], [v
∗
2b ]} − 1 ≥ min{[ c2−1c · logm], [ c1−12 · logm]} times. If we let c1 = 8, c2 = 10 and
c = 4, we have ℓ′ ≥ 2 logm+ 6. Remember that we might not be able to run the recursion till the
conditions are violated, because the CCA might terminate before that. We now use case analysis
to show that if we take ℓ = logm+ 2, then our claim holds no matter whether tℓ exists or not.
Case (i): The CCA terminates between tj and tj+1 for some j < ℓ. In this case, there are at
least |Yj | − c · k bidders each of whom has utility at least uj − 2b. Since ℓ ≤ ℓ′2 + 1, we have
|Yj | − c · k ≥ |Y | − c(j +1)k ≥ |Y |/2 and uj − 2b ≥ v∗− 2(j +1)b ≥ v∗/2. Thus, as in Case (1), the
social welfare of the greedy allocation is at least OPT24 logn .
Case (ii): tℓ exists. In this case, we argue that there is a bidder who has made a bid larger than
b on M \ X ′ that has not been selected by the greedy algorithm. This results in a contradiction.
Note that tℓ ≥ 2ℓ−1 · t1 > 2m · t1 > (k +m) · b. The last inequality holds because every bidder in
B receives an item, so k ≤ K ≤ m. Hence, there is a bidder i in Yℓ that has made (k +m) · b bids
in the ascending-price phase. The revenue of the greedy allocation is less than k · b, so i can make
at most k · b bids on items in X˜ . Therefore, i makes at least m · b bids on M − X˜ , which means
there must be one item j in M − X˜ that i has bid on with price larger than b. This cannot happen,
otherwise i would have been selected by the greedy algorithm. 
4.2 An Upper Bound on the Welfare Ratio for General Bidders
In this section, we generalize Theorem 4 to accommodate general valuation functions. The idea
is similar. Using a greedy algorithm as a proxy for the CCA, we argue that there are only two
possibilities: (i) the revenue of the greedy allocation is at least Ω
(
OPT
C2 logn log2 m
)
, and since the CCA
selects the revenue optimal allocation, it must achieve no less revenue than the greedy allocation;
or (ii) the greedy allocation has small revenue, but many bidders still have high utility at the final
round. Using Fact 3, we can immediately show that the welfare of the allocation selected by the
CCA is at least Ω(OPTlogn ).
Let us first specify the greedy algorithm.
Theorem 7. If bidders only bid on sets with cardinality at most C, then the either the revenue of
the CCA is at least OPT
480C2 logn log2m or the social welfare of the CCA is at least
OPT
24 logn . Thus, the
welfare ratio is at most O(C2 · log n log2m).
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Procedure 3 Greedy Allocation Procedure for General Bidders
Input: M is the set of items. N is the set of bidders. S = {(Sti , P ti )}i,t is the collection of bids
made in the CCA. b ≥ n2 is a threshold on the bid price.
while S 6= ∅ do
Let (Sti , P
t
i ) be a bid of maximum price (break ties arbitrarily).
if P ti ≥ b then
Allocate the set of items Sti to bidder i with price P
t
i .
else
return
end if
Remove from S every bid made by bidder i and every bid for a set of items that are not
disjoint from Sti .
end while
Before proving Theorem 7, let us generalize the time amplifying lemma for general bidders. Let
X be the set of bidders that have been assigned items in the greedy algorithm and X˜ be the set of
items that are allocated. Let k ≥ |X| be some integer. As in the unit-demand case, we will argue
a generalization of Lemma 5 for general bidders. With this Lemma, it is straightforward to argue
that either at least one bidder not in X must make b · m bids on bundles of items which do not
intersect with X˜, or many bidders still have high utility when the price ascending phase ends.
Lemma 8 (Time Amplifying for General Bidders). Let S be a set of at least 4C · k bidders disjoint
from X (|X| ≤ k), such that every bidder i ∈ S has utility at least u ≥ 2C · b in round t ≥ 5/2 · b · C.
If the greedy algorithm has revenue g less than kb−mn, then in any round up to 2(t+ 1) − 1 (the
mechanism can terminate before this), there is a subset of S with at least |S| − 4C · k bidders such
that each of them has utility at least u− 2C · b.
Proof. Let t′ be the first round that at least 4C · k bidders from S have utility at most u − 2C · b,
and S′ be the set of these bidders. It is not difficult to argue that if t′ does not exist, the conclusion
holds.
Since every bidder i ∈ S has utility u in round t, by Fact 1 and 2, we know that for any set
S that i bids on in the first t rounds, vi(S) ≥ u. Let M ′ be the subsets of items in M − X˜ that
has ever been bid on by some bidder from S′ in the first t rounds. The bidders of S′ totally make
|S′| · t bids. How many of their bids can intersect with X˜? Let us assume the greedy algorithm
allocates set Srii to bidder i. Since bidders in S are not selected by the greedy algorithm, they
cannot bid on any item j ∈ Srii after its price has reached P rii , so they can make at most P rii + n
bids containing j. As the size of Srii is at most C, bidders from S can make at most CP rii + Cn bids
that intersect with Srii . Totally, bidders can make at most Cg+ Cnm ≤ Ckb bids that intersect with
X˜, as
∑
i∈X P
ri
i = g ≤ kb−nm. Therefore, bidders from S′ make at least |S′| · t−Ckb bids only on
subsets of M ′.
For any item j ∈ M ′, there could be at most b + n bids from bidders in S containing j. As
every bid is on a set with size at most C, for any set that has ever been bid on, there can be at most
Cb+ Cn other bids that intersect with it. Therefore, we can find at least |S′|·t−CkbCb+Cn disjoint bids on
M ′ that are made in the first t rounds by bidders of S′. Let T be the set of items bid by one of these
disjoint bids. The total price for T at round t′ should be at least 2Cb, otherwise at least one of the
bidders in S′ will have utility greater than u− 2Cb. On the other hand, for any item j ∈ T , bidders
in S′ can bid on sets containing it only when its price is less than b or when the set intersects X˜ ,
since otherwise the bid would have been selected by the greedy algorithm. As |T | ≤ C, bids from X
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and bids intersecting X˜ must push up the price for T by at least C · (b−n). Since there are at least
|S′|·t−Ckb
Cb+Cn such disjoint sets and at most Ckb bids can intersect with X˜, the bids from X on M ′ must
increase the total price of items in M ′ by at least b−nb+n(|S′| · t − Ck · b) − C2kb. Since |X| ≤ k, we
have
t′ ≥ 1Ck
(b− n
b+ n
(|S′| · t− Ck · b)− C2kb
)
≥ b− n
b+ n
· (4t− b)− b · C (|S′| ≥ 4C · k)
≥ (1− 2
n
)(4t− b)− b · C (b ≥ n2)
≥ 2(t+ 1) (t ≥ 5
2
b · C)
By the definition of t′, it is straightforward to see in round t′−1 ≥ 2(t+1)−1 there are at least
|S| − 4C · k bidders from S such that each of them has utility at least u− 2C · b.
We now have all the tools we need to prove Theorem 7.
Proof of Theorem 7: First let us fix the notations. In Lemma 6, we make no assumption on the
sets {Ri}i∈[n]. In particular, we do not assume it is a singleton. Therefore, Lemma 6 also holds in
the general case. Let B and v∗ be the same as in Lemma 6, and use K to denote the size of B. Let
the threshold b = v
∗
c1·C·logm and k =
K
c2·C·logm for some constants c1 and c2 that we will specify later.
We prove by contradiction that the revenue of the greedy algorithm with our choice of b is at least
g = OPT
6c1c2·C2·logn log2m or the social welfare of the CCA is at least
OPT
24 logn .
As in Theorem 4, we can immediately show that k ·b ≥ g. Thus, if the number of bidders selected
by the greedy algorithm |X| exceeds k, the revenue is clearly greater than g. So we can assume
|X| ≤ k. Let X ′ be the set of bidders that are allocated a subset of items that intersect with X˜ in
R∗, and Y = B−X−X ′. Since |X ′| ≤ |X˜ | ≤ C|X| ≤ Ck, we have |Y | ≥ (c2 ·C · logm−C−1)k. Take
t1 (if it exists) to be the first round that at least 4C ·k bidders from Y , such that their allocated sets
of items in R∗ all have prices at least 2C · b. We continue our proof with the following case analysis.
• Case (1): t1 does not exist. Then when the algorithm stops at round t, less than 4C ·k subsets
of items allocated to bidders from Y in R∗ have prices at least 2Cb. Let Y ′ be the bidders of Y
such that the total price of the set of items Ri allocated to i is at most 2Cb at round t (remind
that Ri refers to the set of items allocated to i in R
∗). Notice that |Y ′| ≥ |Y | − 4Ck ≥ |Y |/2
and uti ≥ v∗ − 2Cb ≥ v∗/2 for any i ∈ Y ′. Fact 3 implies that the social welfare of the CCA is
at least |Y | · v∗
4
≥ c2Ck · logm · v
∗
8
≥ Kv
∗
8
≥ OPT
24 log n
.
• Case (2): t1 exists. Let T be the allocated set of items of one of the 4C ·k bidder. As we have
argued in Lemma 8, for any item j in T , only bidders from X or bids intersect with X˜ can
bid on any set containing j after its price reaches b. A simple calculation shows that bidders
from X must make at least 4Ck · (b−n) · C − C2kb bids (as we notice in the proof of Lemma 8
that at most C2kb of total price increment is due to bids that intersect with X˜) in the first t1
rounds. Hence, bidders from X must make at least 3(b− n)C · k − n bids, which means t1 is
at least 3(b−n)·C·k−n|X| . Since k ≥ |X| and b ≥ n2, we have t1 ≥ 52C · b.
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Notice that in round t1 − 1, there are at least |Y | − ck bidders whose allocated items in R∗
have prices less than 2C · b. Let us call this set of bidders Y1, and clearly they all have utility
at least u1 = v
∗− 2C · b. Let t2 (if it exists) be the first round that at least 4C · k bidders from
Y1 have utility no greater than u2 = u1− 2C · b. Let Y2 be the set of bidders from Y1 that still
have utility at least u2 in round t2 − 1. Clearly, |Y2| ≥ |Y1| − 4C · k. Applying Lemma 8 on
Y1, u1 and t1 − 1 shows that t2 − 1 ≥ 2t1 − 1. Hence, t2 ≥ 2t1.
There is nothing special about Y1, u1 and t1− 1. If we recursively define ti (if it exists) as the
first round that at least 4C ·k bidders from Yi−1 have utility no greater than ui = ui−1−2C · b,
and define Yi as the set of bidders from Yi−1 that still have utility at least ui in round ti − 1,
we can apply Lemma 8 on Yi−1, ui−1 and ti−1 − 1 as long as they satisfy the conditions of
Lemma 8 and the CCA does not terminate before ti happens. In that case, we have ti ≥ 2ti−1.
How many times can we apply this Lemma before the conditions are violated? Since every
time the size of Yi decrease by at most 4C · k and ui decrease 2C · b, we can apply Lemma 8
for at least ℓ′ = min{[ |Y1|4C·k ], [ u12C·b ]}− 1 ≥ min{[ c2−14 · logm], [ c1−12 · logm]}. If we let c1 = 8 and
c2 = 10, we have ℓ
′ ≥ 2[logm] + 8. Let ℓ = logm+ 2. Remember that we might not be able
to run the recursion till the conditions are violated, because the CCA might terminate before
that. We now use case analysis to show that if we take ℓ = logm + 2, then our claim holds
no matter the CCA terminates before tℓ or not.
– Case (i): The CCA terminates between tj and tj+1 where j < ℓ. By our choice of the
parameters, we have |Yi|−4Ck ≥ |Y |/2 and ui−2Cb ≥ v∗/2. Thus if tj+1 does not exist,
Fact 3 implies that the welfare of the CCA is at least (|Yi| − 4Ck) · (ui − 2Cb) ≥ |Y |·v
∗
4 ≥
OPT
24 logn .
– Case (ii) tℓ exists. It is straightforward to see that tℓ ≥ 2ℓ−1 ·t1 > 2m·t1 > (Ck+m)·C ·b,
which means there is a bidder i in Yℓ that has made at least (Ck +m) · C · b bids in the
price ascending phase. Since the revenue of the greedy allocation is less than k · b− nm,
so as we have argued in Lemma 8, i can make at most C2 · k · b bids on sets of items
intersecting X˜. Therefore, i makes at least C ·m · b bids contained in M − X˜, then there
must be a set S ⊆M − X˜ that i has bid on with price at least b. This is a contradiction,
because i would have been selected by the greedy algorithm.

5 Lower Bounds on the Welfare Ratio
5.1 Lower bounds for Unit-demand bidders
In this section, we present lower bounds on the welfare ratio of the CCA. To begin, we show give a
polylogarithmic lower bound for unit-demand bidders.
Theorem 9. For any constants N andM, there exists an instance with n ≥ N unit-demand bidders
and m ≥M items such that the social welfare of the CCA is only O
(
log logm·OPT
logm
)
= O
(
logn·OPT
n
)
.
In particular, this implies that the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least Ω
(
logm
log logm
)
.
This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b < 1, the welfare
ratio is at least Ω(na · logbm).
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Notice that Theorem 9 does not contradict with the polylogarithmic upper bound obtained in
Theorem 4. The number of items m of our construction in Theorem 9 is exponential in the number
of bidders n, therefore (log n · log2m) is larger than nlogn . Theorem 9 states that the welfare ratio
is at least Ω( nlogn) if it only depends on n, and is at least Ω(
logm
log logm) if it only depends on m. More
generally, Theorem 9 implies that there is no welfare ratio dominating6 any weighted geometric
mean of the above two ratios, even if we allow dependency on both n and m. On the one hand,
this shows that if any approximation ratio has only sub-logarithmic dependence on m, it must have
polynomial dependence on n. On the other hand, although Theorem 4 has come quite close to the
lower bound above, it has quadratic dependence on logm, thus not contradicting with Theorem 9.
The idea behind the lower bound consists in constructing an instance that is essentially tight
with respect to the proof of Theorem 4. In particular, in the lower bound instance, we ensure that
there are only two bidders who ever make large bids. All the other bidders only make small bids
and their largest bids are on items they value the least! Thus, the revenue maximizing allocation
selected by the CCA has very poor social welfare. Moreover, we have a similar hardness result for
the general case.
Proof. Let k, ℓ be two integers. We will show that for sufficiently large k and ℓ we can construct
an instance that has low social welfare as promised. To avoid cumbersome notations, we assume
that the price increment of the CCA is 1 when two bidders bid on it. Let us denote by (un)n the
sequence such that u0 = 1, u1 = k + 1 and up = k ·
(∑p−1
i=0 ui
)
for any p ≥ 2.
Let us consider the following instance of the CCA. There are 2k+2 bidders s0, s
′
0, s1, s
′
1 . . . , sk, s
′
k.
For each bidder si with i ≥ 1 and for every v ∈ [ℓ], create a set of items Xiv such that there are uℓ−v
items in Xiv . In other words, bidder si has one item of value ℓ, k+1 items of value ℓ−1, u2 items of
value ℓ− 2, etc.. Let Xv = ∪ki=1Xiv and we will refer to it as the set of items of value v7. Moreover,
we assume that bidder si has the following preference rule over the items: if there are a few items
with the same utility, the one with the lowest value is preferred. This preference rule can also be
simulated by making a small modification to the valuation function of si. We will stick with the
preferences rule, as we believe it makes the proof cleaner. The bidders s′1, . . . , s
′
k are respectively
copies of bidders s1, . . . , sk. Since they have the same valuation functions and the same preference
rules, we can assume that at any round they will bid on the same item.
Let us now describe the valuation function of s0. For every v ≤ ℓ, the value of s0 for any item
in Xv is v. Finally, we create a new item which is added in Xℓ and we assume that s0 has value ℓ
for this item. We further assume that, this new item is the one preferred by s0 among all items of
value ℓ. We also assume that s0 has the following preference rule: if there are a few items with the
same utility, the one with the highest value is preferred. Note that the preference rule ensures that
if an item of Xiv has price p and an item of X
i
v−1 has price (p − 1), bidder si bids on the item in
Xiv−1 while s0 bids on the item in X
i
v. Again we create a bidder s
′
0 as a copy of s0.
The fact that bidder si prefers the item with the lowest value (and the fact that X
i
v−1 is large
compared to Xiv) will ensure that the welfare of the allocation of the CCA is small compared to the
optimal one. The key step is to prove the following statement:
Claim 1. None of the bidders s1, s
′
1, . . . , sk, s
′
k makes a bid of price at least 2. Moreover, all their
bids of price 1 are performed on items of X1.
6If ratio r has better dependence on both n and m than ratio r′, we say r dominates r′.
7In Section 3, we assume all bidders’ values are multiples of some large integer W . We can easily modify our hard
instances in this section by multiplying all values with W , and the same conclusion still holds.
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Proof. At round t = 0, all the bidders s1, s
′
1 . . . , sk, s
′
k bid on their favorite items (the items of value
ℓ for their own valuation functions). Both bidders s0 and s
′
0 bid on their favorite item, which is
the special item in Xℓ. So the prices of all these items increase by one (by definition of the price
increment). Now, all items of Xℓ have price 1 and all the other items have price 0.
By construction of our preference rules, bidders s1, s
′
1 . . . , sk, s
′
k start bidding on items of value
ℓ− 1 and s0, s′0 bid on items of value ℓ. Recall that since si, s′i are copies of the same bidder, they
bid on the same item at any round. Since, for every i ≤ k, Xiℓ−1 contains k + 1 items, bidder si
and s′i need to spend k+ 1 rounds to increase the prices of all the items in X
i
ℓ−1 from 0 to 1. Since
there are k + 1 items in Xℓ, bidders s0, s
′
0 also need k + 1 rounds to increase the prices of all the
items of value ℓ from 1 to 2. So by the end of round t = k + 2, all items in Xℓ have price 2 and all
items in Xℓ−1 have price 1. All the other items have price 0.
We now repeat this argument by induction. More precisely, we will show that for every v, there
exists a round tv such that:
• All items in Xv−p have price 0 by the end of round tv for any p > 0.
• All items in Xv+p by the end of round tv have price p+ 1 for any p ≥ 0.
We have already showed that tℓ = 1 and tℓ−1 = k+ 2. Let us prove that the existence of tv implies
the existence of tv−1. Let us study the structure of the bids at round tv. By construction of the
preference rule, bidders s1, s
′
1, . . . , sk, s
′
k prefer bidding on items of value (v − 1) at price 0. On the
other hand, the bidders s0, s
′
0 prefer bidding on items of value between v and ℓ (more precisely they
prefer items in Xℓ, then Xℓ−1 and so on). Since by definition of the sequence (un)n, the number of
items in Xiv−1 is is equal to the number of items in ∪ℓv′=vXv′ . So, for every i, the number of rounds
needed by the bidders si and s
′
i to increase the prices of all the items of X
i
v−1 from 0 to 1 is exactly
the number of rounds needed by s0 and s
′
0 to increase all the prices of all the items in Xv′ for any
v ≤ v′ ≤ ℓ by one.
Consider finally by the end of round t1. All items in Xv have price v for any v ≤ ℓ. The
preference rule ensures that, bidders s1, s
′
1 . . . , sk, s
′
k will increase the prices of items of X1
8. On the
other hand, bidders s0 and s
′
0 increase the prices of all the items in Xv for v ≥ 2 before increasing
the prices of items in X1. Since the size of X
i
1 is precisely the size of ∪ℓv=2Xv for every i, after |Xi1|
rounds the price for each item has increased by one. Now, all items in Xv have price v+1 for every
v ≤ ℓ. As a result, all bidders have negative utility and they drop out.
Finally, we compare the optimal welfare with the welfare of the allocation of the CCA. The
optimal solution allocates to each of s0, s1, . . . , sk her favorite item of value ℓ. Then we can allocate
to s′0, s
′
1, . . . , s
′
k an item in X
i
ℓ−1 for every i. The welfare of the optimal allocation is Θ(kℓ). The
allocation of the CCA allocates an item of Xℓ at price ℓ to both s0 and s
′
0. All the other bidders
only bid on items at price 0 except for items in X1, on which they make bids at price 1, so the CCA
allocates an item of value 1 to each of s1, s
′
1, . . . , sk, s
′
k. Therefore, the welfare of the CCA is 2ℓ+2k.
Note that the number of items in this construction is m = Θ(kℓ) (the number of items of value
v − 1 is essentially k times the number of items of value v). Now if we choose k = Θ(logm), and
the number of bidders is n = Θ(k). If we let k = Θ(m), then ℓ = Θ
(
logm
log logm
)
and n = Θ(logm).
The welfare of the CCA is O
(
log logm·OPT
logm
)
= O
(
logn·OPT
n
)
.
8We assume bidders still participate in the mechanism even if they have utility 0. An alternative approach to
force this behavior is to add a tiny ǫ to all the values.
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If we can guarantee the welfare of the CCA is at least Ω
(
OPT
na·logb m
)
for some a and b such
that a + b < 1, then clearly Ω
(
OPT
na·logbm
)
≥ min
{
Ω
(
OPT
log(a+b)m
)
,Ω
(
OPT
n(a+b)
)}
. Since a + b < 1, this
guarantee contradicts with our instance above.
5.2 Lower bounds for General Bidders
Let us now prove that a similar lower bound can be obtained for general bidders.
Theorem 10. For any constant N and M, there exists an instance with m ≥M items and n ≥ N
bidders who only bid on bundles of cardinality at most C ≤ mc, for some absolute constant c ∈ (0, 12),
such that the CCA’s social welfare is only O
(
log logm·OPT
C·logm
)
= O
(
logn·OPT
n
)
. In particular, this
implies that the welfare ratio of the CCA is at least Ω
(
C · logmlog logm
)
.
This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b < 1, the welfare
ratio is at least O(na · (C · logm)b).
Proof. Let k, ℓ, C be three integers. We fix C to be an odd constant, and we will show that for
sufficiently large k and ℓ we can construct an instance that has low social welfare as promised. The
proof uses the same ingredient as the proof of Theorem 9 but is slightly more involved. We assume
that the price increment for any item is 1/2 times the number of bidders bidding on it. Let un be
the following sequence: u0 = 1, u1 = k · C−12 + 1 and un = k · C−12 ·
∑n−1
i=0 ui + 1. Note that since C
is odd, un is a sequence of integers.
The instance of the CCA has k · C + 2 bidders. They are denoted by :si1, . . . , siC for every i ≤ k
and two special bidders denoted by s0 and s
′
0. Let Bi be the set of bidders s
i
1, . . . , s
i
C . Before
describing the construction, we first introduce the v-gadgets.
v-gadgets. We say a set K of
(C
2
)
items form a v-gadget for a set of bidders {s1, . . . , sC}, if we can
use edges of a clique on C vertices to encode K, such that for any bidder si only the subset of items
corresponding to all edges incident to the vertex i has value C · v to her, while all the other subsets
have value 0. Note that, for any item of the v-gadget, there are exactly two bidders containing it
in their interested bundles (since each edge has two endpoints).
Instance. Before introducing formally the instance, let us briefly describe it. As in the matching
case, all the bidders only bid on items with price 0 till the last round except bidders s0 and s
′
0.
At any round, bidders in Bi for every i bid on a disjoint v-gadget. We will create the appropriate
number of v-gadgets (and an appropriate preference rule) to ensure that none of the bids is positive
except on items with low value. Therefore, we can argue the revenue optimal allocation selected by
the CCA has low social welfare.
For every v ∈ [ℓ] and every i ∈ [k], we create a set Xiv of uℓ−v copies of the v-gadgets for bidders
in Bi. Additionally, for every bidder s
i
j, we create a special item r
i
j . Each bidder s
j
i has value 1/2
for her special item and C · v for any bundle of items corresponding to the set of all edges of the i-th
vertex in some v-gadget of Xiv for all v ∈ [ℓ], but has value 0 for any other bundle. We use Xv to
denote the union of all Xiv and refer to it as the set of items with value v.
To simplify the proof, we assume that all bidders in Bi obey the following preference rule: (i) all
bidders have the same preference order over the v-gadgets of the same utility, i.e. if two v-gadgets
have exactly the same prices9, then all bidders prefer the same v-gadget; (ii) each bidder sij prefers
9Each item and its counterpart in the other v-gadget shares the same price.
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to bid on the set of items with lower value when there is a tie; (iii) a bidder will not bid on any
v-gadget with utility 0, but will still bid on her special item at price 12 . As we mentioned in the
proof of Theorem 9, the preference rule above can be easily simulated with slight perturbations on
the valuation functions.
Now we describe the valuation function of s0. We first create a special item r0 with value 1/2,
and add a set of C new items to Xℓ such that the whole set has value C · v. For any v-gadget, we
partition it into C−12 disjoint subsets of size C, such that v0’s value for each of these subsets is C · v.
Except the bundles mentioned above, all other bundles have value 0. We also assume that s0 obeys
a preference rule: (i) among all bundles of value C · ℓ, the bundle of C new items is preferred; (ii)
s0 prefers the set of items with higher value when there is a tie. Finally, we create s
′
0 as a copy of
bidder s0, such that she has the same valuation function and same preference over bundles.
Our preference rule ensures that the CCA’s welfare is small. The key step of our proof is to
show the following statement:
Claim 2. None of the bidders sj1, . . . , s
j
C for any j ≤ k makes positive bids except on her special
item on which she makes a bid at price 12 .
Proof. The proof is similar to Claim 1.
At round t = 0, all bidders sj1, . . . , s
j
C bid on their favorite bundles (the unique bundle of value
C · ℓ in the ℓ-gadget). Moreover s0 and s′0 bid on the bundle of new items in Xℓ (the set of C items
we create when we define the valuation function of s0). So by the end of the first round, the prices
of all items of Xℓ are increased to 1, while the prices for all the other items remain at 0.
By definition of our preference rules, bidders si1, . . . , s
i
C start bidding on (ℓ − 1)-gadgets and
s0, s
′
0 continue to bid on the ℓ-gadgets. Since there are k · C−12 +1 different (ℓ− 1)-gadgets in Xiℓ−1
for every i ∈ [k], si1, . . . , siC need k · C−12 + 1 rounds to increase the prices of all the items in Xℓ−1
from 0 to 1. Since there are k · (C2)+ C items in Xℓ and these items are partitioned into subsets of
size C, bidders s0, s′0 also need k · C−12 + 1 rounds to increase the prices of all these items of value
ℓ from 1 to 2. So by the end of round t = k · C−12 + 2, all the items in Xℓ have price 2 and all the
items in Xℓ−1 have price 1. All the other items still have price 0.
We now repeat this argument by induction. More precisely, let us prove that, for every v, there
exists a round tv such that:
• All items in Xv−p have price 0 by the end of round tv for any p > 0.
• All items in Xv+p by the end of round tv have price p+ 1 for any p ≥ 0.
We have already showed that tℓ = 1 and tℓ−1 = k · C−12 + 2. Now we will prove that the existence
of tv implies the existence of tv−1. Let us first understand the structure of the bids at round tv.
By construction of the preference rule, si1, . . . , s
i
C prefer bidding on bundles of the (v − 1)-gadgets
in Xiv−1 which have price 0 for every i ∈ [k]. Since they have the same preference over the gadgets,
they bid on the same (v − 1)-gadget. In the meantime, the bidders s0, s′0 are bidding on v′-gadgets
with v ≤ v′ ≤ ℓ (more precisely, they first bid on ℓ-gadgets, then on (ℓ− 1)-gadgets, etc.). By the
definition of the sequence (un)n, the number of (v − 1)-gadgets in Xiv−1 equals to
|∪ℓ
v′=v
Xv′ |
C . Thus,
the number of rounds needed by the bidders si1, . . . , s
i
C to increase the prices of all the items in X
i
v−1
from 0 to 1 is exactly the number of rounds needed by s0 and s
′
0 to increase the prices of all the
items in Xv′ for any v ≤ v′ ≤ ℓ by 1. As a result, tv−1 exists and equals to tv + |Xiv−1|.
By the end of round t1, every bidder has utility 0 on any item in Xv for any v ∈ [ℓ]. In the next
round, all bidders bid on their special items. By the end of round t1 + 1, each items r
i
j has price
1
2 and r0 has price 1. Thus, bidders s0 and s
′
0 drop out (since the last item reach price 1) and the
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other bidders will bid on their special items for another round at price 1/2. By the end of round
t1 + 2, the mechanism terminates as the stopping condition is met. Namely, all bids are disjoint
and the revenue optimal allocation does not conflict with the final allocation.
Now we are ready to compare the welfare of the CCA to the optimal social welfare. Consider the
following allocation (which is not optimal but sufficient to show our result): for every i, assign si1 its
bundle in the ℓ-gadget, each of the other bidders her bundle in a distinct (ℓ− 1)-gadget (assuming
k ≥ 2). The welfare of this allocation is larger than Θ(k · C2 · ℓ). In the revenue optimal allocation
selected by the CCA, two disjoints sets of value C · ℓ are allocated to s0 and s′0, and all the other
bidders only receive their special items of value 12 . The welfare of the CCA is only 2C · ℓ+ k · C/2.
Note that the number of items in this construction is Θ((k · C)ℓ) (the number of items of value v− 1
is essentially k · C times the number of items of value v) and the number of bidders is Θ(C ·k). Since
log C ≤ c·logm for some absolute constant c, we choose k to be Θ(logm), then ℓ = Θ
(
logm
log C+log logm
)
and n = Θ(C · logm). The welfare of the CCA is O
(
(log logm+log C)·OPT
C·logm
)
= O
(
logn·OPT
n
)
. For any
fixed integer C, this is the same as O
(
log logm·OPT
C·logm
)
If we can guarantee the welfare of the CCA is at least Ω
(
OPT
na·(C·logm)b
)
for some a and b such that
a + b < 1, then clearly Ω
(
OPT
na·(C·logm)b
) ≥ min{Ω( OPT
(C logm)(a+b)
)
,Ω
(
OPT
n(a+b)
)}
. Since a + b < 1, this
guarantee contradicts with our instance above.
6 The Importance of the Price Increment and the Stopping Rule
In this section, we show that if price increments do not depend of the demand or if the stopping
condition is replaced by the one of the SMRA (the auction stops when the bids are disjoint), then
we can obtain lower bounds on the welfare ratio.
6.1 Welfare Under the Original CCA
In the original CCA model designed by Porter et al. [36], the price increment is always 1 when there
is an excess demand. In this section, we show that the welfare under this model could be as low as
O( OPT
poly(n)) even for simple valuations such as additive and unit-demand valuations. The valuation
function of bidder i is additive if a bidder’s value for set S is the sum of the values of the items in
S.
Lemma 11. Assume that the price increment does not depend on the demand. For any constants
N and M, there exists an instance with n ≥ N unit-demand bidders and m ≥ M items such that
the social welfare of the CCA is only O(OPT√
n
) = O(OPT√
m
).
This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b ≤ 1, the welfare
ratio is at least Ω(na/2 ·mb/2).
Proof. Let n ≥ max(N ,M). Consider a unit-demand auction with items {0, 1, 2, . . . , n}. Let t be
a real defined below. We have two classes of bidders. In the first class we have n bidders and for
any package S, bidder i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) has a value
vi(S) = max
j∈S
vi({j})
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where
vi({j}) =


t · V if j = 0,
V if j = i
0 otherwise
In the second class we have 2
√
n bidders. For each 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ √n − 1 we have two identical bidders.
The two identical bidders ℓ have a valuation function
vℓ(S) = max
j∈S
vℓ({j})
for any package S, where
vℓ({j}) =
{
V if j ∈ Hℓ = {ℓ ·
√
n+ 1, ℓ · √n+ 2, . . . , (ℓ+ 1) · √n}
0 otherwise
Let us examine what happens in this auction. Each pair of bidders in the second class will bid on
the cheapest item in the set Hℓ of cardinality
√
n. In the case of a tie, we may assume they both
bid on the smallest index item.10 It follows that after V · √n rounds the price of every item in Hℓ
will reach V and then the pair of bidders ℓ will drop out of the auction.
Meanwhile, bidder i in the first class will continually bid on item 0, at least until its price is
t · V − V . This will take (t− 1) · V rounds. But at this time, provided we set t ≥ √n+1, the price
of item i will be above V . So bidder i will continue to bid on item 0 until its price reaches t · V
when it will drop out of the auction.
Given this set of bids what is the optimal allocation? For 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ √n− 1, both bidders of type
ℓ in the second class will be allocated one item from the set Hℓ. Furthermore, exactly one bidder
i of the first class, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, will be allocated the item 0. The other bidders of the first
class do not make any bid on any other items and thus are not allocated anything. Thus the total
welfare of this allocation is
2
√
n · V + t · V = (3√n+ 1) · V
On the other hand the optimal allocation has value
n · V + t · V = (n+√n+ 1) · V
Hence the welfare ratio is at least 13
√
n.
Lemma 12. Assume that the price increment does not depend on the demand. For any constants N
and M, there exists an instance with n ≥ N bidders that bid on sets of size at most 2 and m ≥M
items such that the social welfare of the CCA is only O(OPTn ) = O(
OPT
m ).
This implies that for any non-negative real numbers a and b such that a + b ≤ 1, the welfare
ratio is at least Ω(na ·mb).
Proof. Let n ≥ max(N ,M). Consider an auction with items {0, 1, . . . , n}. Let there be 2n bidders.
In particular, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n there are two identical bidders of Type i. Each Type i bidders has
a 2-demand function vi , that is, additive up to 2 items. Each individual item is valued as:
vi({j}) =
{
V if j ∈ {0, i}
0 otherwise
10This can be enforced by adding a small perturbation to the valuation function.
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Here V is a large integer. Now let’s run the CCA with a price increment of ǫ = 1 for excess demand
items. We begin with all price equal to zero. Then each Type i bidder bids for the pair {0, i} as
it provides a utility of 2V . Not that since there are two bidders for each type the every item is in
excess demand, so all prices rise to 1. Each Type i bidder then still bids for the pair {0, i}, and
continues to do so until every item has a price of V . The auction then terminates with all prices
equal to V + 1. But now, given these bids, when we find a maximum revenue allocation we may
only accept one bid since every submitted bid contained the item 0. Thus we obtain a welfare of
2V . In contrast, it is easy to see that the optimal welfare is (n+ 1) · V . Hence the welfare ratio is
1
2(n+ 1).
Finally note that in [9], a similar example shows the poor performance of the Porter et al.
mechanism.
6.2 Bad Examples using the SMRA Stopping Condition
In our CCA and as well as the original model of Porter et.al [36], the CCA terminates when there
is no excess demand induced by the bids in the current round and the maximum revenue allocation
over all rounds is not in conflict with the current round bids. A simpler condition is to stop im-
mediately once the bids become disjoint as in the SMRA. This simpler rule is now used in recent
real-world CCA auctions. In the following example, we show that the SMRA stopping condition
has arbitrarily bad performance when used in the CCA.
Lemma 13. There does not exist any garantee on the welfare ratio if the CCA stops when the bids
are disjoint.
Proof. Consider an auction with 3 additive bidders and 4 items. Let c be an integer larger than 2.
Here are the bidders’ valuations
v1({j}) =


V if j = 1
2V if j = 2
0 otherwise
v2({j}) =


V if j = 4
2V if j = 3
0 otherwise
v3({j}) =
{
c · V if j ∈ {2, 3}
0 otherwise
At round 0, every bidder bids on their favorite set. Bidder 1 bids on set {1, 2}, bidder 2 bids on set
{3, 4} and bidder 3 bids on set {2, 3}. It is easy to verify that at round t ≤ V , these are still the
sets bidders bid on. Both item 1 and 4 have price t, and both item 2 and 3 have price 2t. At round
V + 1, bidder 1 and 2 drop out as they have utility 0, while bidder 3 still bids on set {2, 3} with
total price 4V + 4. If we stop at this round, the revenue optimal allocation gives item 1 and 2 to
bidder 1 with price 3V and item 3 and 4 to bidder 2 with price 3V . The welfare for this allocation
is 6V .
Since c > 2, the welfare maximizing allocation should give bidder 3 both items 2 and 3, give
bidder 1 item 1 and give bidder 2 item 4. The welfare of this allocation is 2(c+1) ·V . So the welfare
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ratio of the CCA with this stopping rule is at least c+16 = Θ(c). Since c can be arbitrarily large and
does not depend on n and m, the welfare ratio can be arbitrarily bad which achieves the proof.
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